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22 May 1957

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

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FROM : [REDACTED] 25X1A8a

SUBJECT : Comments on [REDACTED] Brief, "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as an Expression of the International Communist Party Line for 1957", dated 18 January 1957.

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1. Our over-all impression of this paper is its somewhat too emotional and, therefore, perhaps too subjective presentation. We feel that an intelligence paper - which this analysis is - should be written in concentrated and passionless objectivity.

2. We also feel that perhaps you give the 30 June Resolution less credit than it deserves. The poor quality of this statement does not exclude the fact that it contained the major points of interpretation and prescription which have been applied since its publication.

3. We doubt that the Kremlin actively collaborated, but Peiping may have informed it on the general tenor of the article prior to publication, possibly not much earlier than shortly before Chou En-lai's departure for Eastern Europe. This, however, must remain in the realm of speculation. *right*

4. We do not go along with you in believing that the Peiping article will catch only "little fish." We are inclined to attach far more importance to this statement. Also, we believe that it will be quite effective, and not only in the sense of Gomulkanism. As a matter of fact, in re-reading the piece, we think that it is an intricate work of Communist dialectic that is far better than almost anything the Soviets have put out for years. It combines apparently contradictory factors into a unity of purpose that is Bolshevik with Chinese overtones.

5. We feel, moreover, that you overplay Tito and underplay the thesis of Great-nation chauvinism. In this connection, we do not feel that paragraph 8 gives a correct appraisal of the sense of the article. A distinction has been made between the recognized

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ideological leadership of the USSR in matters of general principle and the definite leeway left to countries which desire to proceed along different roads to achieve these principles. Mao's later statements seem to have borne this out. In other words, the USSR still is the base of World Communism and all other Communist regimes are to recognize this fact. Nevertheless, the position of the USSR as primus inter pares does not imply a slavish imitation of Soviet methods. Again, Mao's recent methodological theses appear to modify the Soviet concept considerably. *not in detail*

6. As we stated last January, the purpose of this article seems to us to contain a definite statement of the Chicom ideological position in the recent and current intra-Communist dissension. Also, the timing of the publication of this paper, about two weeks prior to Chou's departure for Moscow and his visits to Warsaw and Budapest, is significant. For the Peiping article not only contained a comprehensive roundup of Chicom views but was almost certainly also written in a vein that would help Peiping to obtain more economic concessions from Moscow, despite the Soviet commitments in the EE satellites and uncommitted nations.

7. While on the whole we agree with your very last sentence, we should like to insert here the view that Peiping, even within the Communist framework, seems to us to follow the China First thesis. And that may, some day, lead to conflict with the USSR.

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has been significant  
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